Abstract. We study a class of noncooperative stochastic games with unbounded cost functions and an uncountable state space. It is assumed that the transition law is absolutely continuous with respect to some probability measure on the state space. Undiscounted stochastic games with expected average costs are considered first. It is shown under a uniform geometric ergodicity assumption that there exists a stationary ε-equilibrium for each ε > 0. The proof is based on recent results on uniform bounds for convergence rates of Markov chains [S. P. Meyn and R. L. Tweedie, Ann. Appl. Probab., 4 (1994), pp. 981-1011] and on an approximation method similar to that used in [A. S. Nowak, J. Optim. Theory Appl., 45 (1985), pp. 591-602], where an ε-equilibrium in stationary policies was shown to exist for the bounded discounted costs. The stochastic game is approximated by one with a countable state space for which a stationary Nash equilibrium exists (see [E. Altman, A. Hordijk, and F. M. Spieksma, Math. Oper. Res., 22 (1997), pp. 588-618]); this equilibrium determines an -equilibrium for the original game. Finally, new results for the existence of stationary ε-equilibrium for discounted stochastic games are given.
1.
Introduction. This paper treats nonzero-sum stochastic games with general state space and unbounded cost functions. Our motivation for studying unbounded costs comes from applications of stochastic games to queuing theory and telecommunication networks (see [2, 3, 4, 38] ). We assume that the transition law is absolutely continuous with respect to some probability measure on the state space. For the expected average cost case, we impose some stochastic stability conditions, considered often in the theory of Markov chains in general state space [25, 26] . These assumptions imply the so-called ν-geometric ergodicity condition for Markov chains governed by stationary multipolicies of players. Using an approximation technique similar to that in [29] , we prove the existence of stationary ε-equilibria in m-person average cost games satisfying the mentioned stability conditions and some standard regularity assumptions. A similar result is stated for discounted stochastic games, but then we do not impose any ergodicity assumptions. To obtain an ε-equilibrium, we apply a recent result by Altman, Hordijk, and Spieksma [4] given for nonzero-sum stochastic games with countably many states. Completely different approximation schemes for stochastic games with a separable metric state space were given by Rieder [39] and Whitt [48] . As in [29] , they considered only (bounded) discounted stochastic games.
The passage from finite (or even countably infinite) state space with possibly unbounded cost turns out to be quite a tough problem. In fact, the question of the existence of stationary Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum stochastic games with uncountable state space remains open even in the discounted case. Only some special classes of games are known to possess a stationary Nash equilibrium. For example, Parthasarathy and Sinha [37] proved the existence of stationary Nash equilibria in discounted stochastic games with finitely many actions for the players and state independent nonatomic transition probabilities. Their result was extended by Nowak [30] to a class of uniformly ergodic average cost games. There are papers on certain economic games in which a stationary equilibrium is shown to exist by exploiting a very special transition and payoff structure; see, for example, [5, 7] . Mertens and Parthasarathy [24] reported the existence of nonstationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of discounted stochastic games with norm continuous transition probabilities. Some results for nonzero-sum stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure (and, in particular, games with complete information) are given by Küenle [19, 20] . Finally, Harris, Reny, and Robson [13] proved the existence of correlated subgame-perfect equilibria in a class of stochastic games with weakly continuous transition probabilities. We would like to point out that the only papers which deal with nonzero-sum average cost stochastic games with uncountable state space are [20] and [30] . In the zero-sum case, the theory of stochastic games with uncountable state spaces is much more complete. Mertens and Neyman [23] provided some conditions for the existence of value, and Maitra and Sudderth [21, 22] developed a general theory of zero-sum stochastic games with limsup payoffs. Stationary optimal strategies exist in the average cost zero-sum games only if some ergodicity conditions are imposed in the model; see, for example, [31, 34, 15, 17, 18] .
In this paper, we make use of an extension of Federgruen's work [11] given by Altman, Hordijk, and Spieksma [4] . Other approaches (based on different assumptions) to nonzero-sum stochastic games with countably many states can be found in [6, 40] and [33] . Some results on sensitive equilibria in a class of ergodic stochastic games are discussed in [33, 16, 35] . To close this brief overview of the existing literature, we note that the theory of stochastic games is much more complete in the case of finite state and action spaces. On one hand, many deep existence theorems are available at the moment; see [23, 22, 44, 45] and some references therein. On the other hand, a theory of algorithms for solving special classes of stochastic games with finitely many states and actions is also well developed [12] .
In order to study the uncountable state space, we make use of Lyapunov-type techniques [25] (which also allows us to treat unbounded costs) and of approximations based on discretization. Unfortunately, the discretization to a countable state space does not directly yield a setting for which we can apply the existing theory for stochastic games with a countable state [4] . For example, the Foster (or Lyapunov)-type conditions that have been used for countable Markov chains always involved the requirement of a negative drift outside a finite set, whereas our discretization provides a negative drift outside a countable set. Also, ensuring that the approximating game maintains the same type of ergodic structure as the initial game turned out to be a highly complex problem. The fact that our model allows us to handle unbounded costs is very useful in stochastic games occurring in queueing and in networking applications; see [2, 3, 4, 38] , in which bounded costs turn out to be unnatural.
The involved process of discretization given in our paper, which requires assumptions that may be restrictive in some applications, may suggest that, when possible, other equilibrium concepts might be sought instead of the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, some results on the existence of stationary correlated equilibria are available at the moment [36, 30, 10] . This type of equilibrium allows for some coordination between players, and the proof of existence is considerably simpler. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our game model. Section 3 is devoted to studying the average cost games. In section 4, we examine discounted stochastic games. An appendix is given in section 5, which contains some auxiliary results on piecewise constant policies in controlled Markov chains.
The model and notation.
Before presenting the model, we collect some basic definitions and notation. Let (Ω, F) be a measurable space, where F is the σ-field of subsets in Ω. By P(Ω) we denote the space of all probability measures on (Ω, F). If Ω is a metric space, then F is assumed to be the Borel σ-field in Ω. Let (S, G) be another measurable space. We write P (·|ω) to denote a transition probability from Ω into S. Recall that P (·|ω) ∈ P(S) for each ω ∈ Ω, and P (D|·) is a measurable function for each D ∈ G.
We now describe the game model: (i) S-the state space, endowed with a countably generated σ-field G. 
Γ i the set of all multipolicies, and by U the subset of stationary multipolicies. Let H = S × X × S × X × · · · be the space of all infinite histories of the game, endowed with the product σ-field. For any γ ∈ Γ and every initial state s 1 = s ∈ S, a probability measure P γ s and a stochastic process {S k , X k } are defined on H in a canonical way, where the random variables S k and X k describe the state and the action, respectively, chosen by the players on the kth stage of the game (see Proposition V.1.1 in [28] ). Thus, for each initial state s ∈ S, any multipolicy γ ∈ Γ, and any finite horizon n, the expected n-stage cost of player i is
where E γ s means the expectation operator with respect to the probability measure P γ s . (Later on we make an assumption on the functions c i that assures that all the expectations considered in this paper are well defined.)
The average cost per unit time to player i is defined as
If β is a fixed real number in (0, 1), called the discount factor, then the expected discounted cost to player i is 
We similarly define ε-equilibria for the expected discounted cost games. Of course, a 0-equilibrium will be called a Nash equilibrium.
To ensure the existence of ε-equilibrium strategies for the players in the stochastic game, we will accept some regularity conditions on the primitive data, and in the average expected cost case we will also impose some general Lyapunov stability assumptions on the transition structure.
In both the discounted and average cost cases, we make the following assumptions.
C1: For each player i and s ∈ S, c i (s, ·) is continuous on X. Moreover, there exists a measurable function
C2: There exists a probability measure ϕ ∈ P(S) such that
where ν was defined above (2.1).
Remark 2.1. Let w be a measurable function such that 1 ≤ w(s) ≤ ν(s) + δ for all s ∈ S and for some δ > 0. If
This follows from C2, since ν ≥ 1 implies that
3. The undiscounted stochastic game. To formulate our further assumptions, we introduce some helpful notation. Let
and, for any set D ∈ G, we set
By Q n (·|s, u), we denote the n-step transition probability induced by Q and the multipolicy u ∈ U.
C3 (Drift inequality): Let ν : S → [1, ∞) be some given measurable function. There exists a set C ∈ G such that ν is bounded on C and for some ξ ∈ (0, 1) and η > 0 we have
C4: There exist a λ ∈ (0, 1) and a probability measure ζ concentrated on the set C such that
Q(D|s, x) ≥ λζ(D)
for any s ∈ C, x ∈ X and for each measurable set D ⊂ C.
For any measurable function w : S → R, we define the ν-weighted norm as
We write L ∞ ν to denote the Banach space of all measurable functions w for which w ν is finite.
Condition C3 implies that, outside a set C, the function ν decreases under any stationary multipolicy u; i.e.,
This is known as a drift condition. If (i) the state space is countable, (ii) the set C is finite, and (iii) the state space is communicating under a stationary policy u, then (3.1) implies that the Markov chain (when using u) is ergodic. (This is the well known Foster criterion for ergodicity; see, e.g., [27] .)
In the uncountable infinite state space, the same drift condition should be used to obtain the ergodicity condition. However, the finiteness of the set C is replaced by a weaker assumption. Namely, C has to be a small set or a petite set [25] ; condition C4 is a simple sufficient condition for the set C to be small.
Beyond the ergodicity of the Markov chain {S k } under a stationary multipolicy, Foster-type criteria (i.e., conditions C3-C4) also ensure the finiteness of the expectation E for every potential cost function w ∈ L ∞ ν ; moreover, they provide a geometric rate of convergence of the expected costs at time k to the steady state cost for w ∈ L ∞ ν . These statements will be made precise below.
Note that C3-C4 provide uniform conditions for ergodicity; i.e., ξ, ζ, C, and λ do not depend on the actions (or on the policies). This will be needed in order for approximating games (with countable state space) to have stationary Nash equilibria [4] . 
ν and s ∈ S, n ≥ 1. Proof. C3-C4 imply that for any stationary u, the chain is positive Harris recurrent (see Theorem 11.3.4 in [25] ). It is thus ψ u -irreducible (see Chapter 9 of [25] ). The aperiodicity (and, in fact, strong aperiodicity) follows from condition C4 (see [25, p. 116] ). This establishes C5. C6 follows from Theorem 2.3 in [26] .
Remark 3.1. From Lemma 3.1 it follows that for any player i and u ∈ U we have
that is, the expected average cost of player i is independent of the initial state. Theorem 2.3 in [26] implies that the constants α and θ in Lemma 3.1 depend only on ξ, η, λ, and ν C = sup s∈C ν(s) (and, in particular, they do not depend on u). C1, C3, and C4 imply that the expected costs considered in this section are well defined for any multipolicy γ ∈ Γ; see [34] or [14] .
In what follows, whenever we assume C1-C4, we shall take the same function ν in C1 as in C3. We are now ready to state our first main result.
Theorem 3.1. Consider an undiscounted stochastic game satisfying C1-C4. Then for any ε > 0 there exists a stationary ε-equilibrium.
The proof of this result is based on an approximation technique and consists of several steps which will be described later on. Before proving the result, we briefly mention the approach and the steps we are using, the difficulties, and the way we overcome these difficulties.
Basic idea behind the proof. Our basic goal is to approximate our game by a sequence of m-person games with countable state spaces and compact action spaces and which have equilibria in stationary policies; based on such approximating games, we shall construct a stationary policy which is an -equilibrium for the original game. The basic idea here is similar to the one already used in [29] for the problem with discounted cost. However, the situation here is much more involved; indeed, in the discounted case one does not need to bother about the ergodic structure of the approximating games in order to show that they possess equilibrium in stationary policies. Here, in contrast, we need to carefully construct the approximating games so as to ensure that they not only have the required ergodic property but also are uniform ergodic and have some additional "good" properties for the cost. Our first step in the proof will be to construct such approximating games, which will also satisfy conditions C1-C4. The function ν, as well as the other objects that appear in these assumptions, will be approximated as well. (We will have to show, for example, that the approximation of ξ is indeed within (0, 1), etc.) The approximation of the game in a way that allows conditions similar to C1-C4 to hold is done in the next two subsections.
Properties similar to C2-C4 were used in [4] to establish the existence of equilibria in stationary policies for games with countable state space; the properties imply, for example, that the costs are continuous in the policies. Unfortunately, the counterpart of property C4 that is used to establish ergodicity in the literature of countable state Markov chains (or for Markov decision processes, or for Markov games) requires that the set C that appears in conditions C3-C4 be finite. Unfortunately, we were not able to come up with a direct approximation scheme for which C is finite. To overcome this problem, we first use some results from [26] to obtain uniform ergodicity results for the approximating chains. Using a key theorem from [41] , this will be shown to imply that there exist some function (instead of the original approximation of ν) and constants for which properties C3-C4 hold and for which C is a singleton. This is done in subsection 3.3.
Transition operators and their ν-weighted norms. If f ∈ L
∞ ν and σ is a finite signed measure on (S, G), then for convenience we set
provided that this integral exists. Let P 1 and P 2 be transition subprobabilities from S into S. Define
We will also use the definition (3.2) in the case in which P 1 and P 2 are probability measures on (S, G), or when one of them is zero. Note that if P 2 = 0 and P 1 is a transition probability, then it follows from (3.2) that
If P 1 and P 2 are transition probabilities and P 1 − P 2 < ∞, then P 1 − P 2 induces a bounded linear operator from L ∞ ν into itself, and P 1 − P 2 ν is its operator norm (see Lemma 16.1.1 in [25] ).
We now come back to our game model and accept the following notation. For any u ∈ U , we use Q(u) to denote the operator on L
Clearly, (3.3) implies that Q(u) is (under condition C3) a bounded linear operator from L ∞ ν into itself. By Π(u) we denote the invariant probability measure operator given by
where π u is the invariant probability measure for Q(·|s, u), u ∈ U , and f ∈ L ∞ ν .
Approximating games.
We define Γ A to be the class of stochastic games that "resemble" stochastic games with countably many states and can be used to approximate the original game. The games in Γ A will depend on some parameter δ > 0. The transition probability in a game belonging to Γ A is denoted by Q δ , and the cost function of player i is denoted by c i δ . We introduce some notation:
• N-the set of positive integers,
• C(X)-the Banach space of all continuous functions on X, endowed with the supremum norm ||·||,
We assume that each game G δ ∈ Γ A corresponds to some sequences {Y n }, {c i n }, {z n }, and {ν n }, where n belongs to some subset N 1 ⊂ N and {Y n } is a measurable partition of the state space such that
for all s ∈ Y n , x ∈ X, and n ∈ N 1 . Moreover, ν n are rational numbers and ν n ≥ 1 for all n ∈ N 1 . Define ν δ (s)
We will show that for each δ > 0 it is possible to construct a game G δ such that c i n ∈ C(X) and z n (·, x) ∈ L 1 ν while z n (s, ·) ∈ C(X) for all n ∈ N 1 , x ∈ X, and s ∈ S. Because in our approximation we need to preserve (in some sense) condition C4, we consider the following subset ∆ ⊂ L 1 ν : φ ∈ ∆ if and only if φ is a density function such that
. By Scheffe's theorem, φ is a density function. Moreover, φ satisfies (3.4). Thus, we have shown that ∆ is a closed and convex subset of L 1 ν . Let V be the space of all continuous mappings from X into ∆ with the metric ρ defined by
Since G is countably generated, L 1 is separable. As in [47, Theorem I.5.1], we can prove the following.
Lemma 3.2. V is a complete separable metric space.
Note that the proof of Theorem I.5.1 in [47] makes use of the convexity of the range space of the continuous mappings involved. In our case, the range space ∆ is also convex.
For each s ∈ S, the transition probability density z of the original game induces elements φ(s, ·) of V by
φ(s, x) = z(s, ·, x).
From the product measurability of z on S × S × X, it follows that s → φ(s, ·) is a measurable mapping from S into V .
We introduce the following notation:
where {r k } is the set of all rational numbers satisfying r k ≥ 1. Let 0 < δ < 1 be fixed. Define for any k,
Let τ be a (fixed) one-to-one correspondence between N and
Let {Y n } be the enumeration of all nonempty setsȲ k . Clearly, {Y n } is a measurable countable partition of the state space, and n belongs to some N 1 ⊂ N.
If necessary, we can modify (trivially) this partition in such a way that Y n ⊂ C or Y n ⊂ S \ C for each n. Note that for each n ∈ N 1 and each set Y n there correspond some z n ∈ V and c i n ∈ C(X), so that we obtain a game G δ ∈ Γ A . Moreover, we have
, by definition) for each n ∈ N 1 and s ∈ Y n . This implies that
for every u ∈ U . Next, we have
We also have
for every s ∈ S.
3.3.
Equivalence with a game with a countable state space. Next, we shall show that the G δ game has an equilibrium in the class of stationary multipolicies. This will be done in the proof of the following lemma. 
for every s ∈ S and x ∈ X. Since C3 holds for the original game, this implies that
From (3.8) and (3.9), we conclude that
for every s ∈ S and x ∈ X; i.e., a condition of the type C3 holds. Condition C4 follows from the construction of ∆ (above (3.4) ).
(ii) Consider the approximating games under the further assumption that every player i restricts to the class U Denote by U 0 the set of all stationary piecewise constant multipolicies. Every game G δ with the above restriction is equivalent to a stochastic game denoted byḠ with the countable state space N 1 (defined in our approximation procedure). Because every stationary multipolicy inḠ corresponds to a multipolicy in U 0 , we will use U 0 also to denote the set of all stationary multipolicies inḠ. The cost functions inḠ are c i n ∈ C(X), where n ∈ N 1 . The transition probabilities inḠ are given by
for all s ∈ Y m , u ∈ U 0 , and m, n ∈ N 1 . Let P (u) denote the transition probability matrix corresponding to any u ∈ U 0 . Finally, the piecewise constant function ν δ induces a function µ :
(Sometimes we will identify µ with the column vector, and µ(n) with its nth coordinate.) Fix δ such that ξ δ < 1. Applying Lemma 3.1 to the game G δ , we conclude that it satisfies C5. By part (i) and Theorem 2.3 in [26] , this game also satisfies C6 (with possibly different constants θ 1 and α 1 ). A simple translation of C5 to the gameḠ with countably many states says that for any u ∈ U 0 the Markov chain with the transition probability matrix P (u) has a single ergodic class and is aperiodic. On the other hand, a translation of C6 and the fact that ||Q δ (u)|| ν δ ≤ ξ δ + η (which follows from (3.10)) mean that the Markov chain is µ-uniform geometric ergodic; see [9, 41] . By Key Theorem II and Lemma 5.3(ii) in [41] , there exist a nonempty finite set M ⊂ N 1 , a functionμ : N 1 → [1, ∞), and some b ∈ (0, 1) such that
for every k ∈ N 1 and u ∈ U 0 . This property is called theμ-uniform geometric recurrence (see [8, 9, 41] ) and is Assumption A2(1) in [4] . The functionμ is given bỹ
where k ∈ N 1 ( M P (u) is the matrix P (u) in which we replace the columns corresponding to states m ∈ M by zeros); see [4, pp. 99-100] . Note that this new functionμ is µ-bounded (i.e., sup n∈N1μ (n)/µ(n) < ∞) and vice versa. Indeed, µ(k) ≤μ(k) for each k. On the other hand, by (3.11), we have
Sinceμ is µ-bounded and vice versa, this implies theμ-continuity of the immediate costs (recall C1) and of the transition probabilities (recall C2 and Remark 2.1). This is Assumption 1 * in [4] . Since both assumptions 1 * as well as 2(1) in [4] hold, it follows that the gameḠ has a stationary Nash equilibrium u * ∈ U 0 , and consequently G δ has a stationary equilibrium (also denoted by u * ) in the class U 0 of all stationary piecewise constant multipolicies. It now follows from Lemma 5.1 in the appendix that u * is a Nash equilibrium for the game G δ in the class U of all stationary multipolicies. Let Q δ (u) and Π δ (u) denote the transition probability and the invariant probability measure operators under any stationary multipolicy u ∈ U in the approximating game.
Lemma 3.4. Under C1-C4, 3.3 ) the games G δ satisfy C4 and C3, with ξ replaced by ξ δ . By (3.10), we have ||Q δ (u)|| ν δ ≤ ξ δ + η for all u ∈ U . This and Theorem 2.3 in [26] (applied to the games G δ ) imply that there exists a δ 0 such that
The rest of the proof is an adaptation of the proof of Proposition 1 in [42] . By Lemma 3.1 and Remark 3.1, there exist some θ > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1) such that
for every n. Hence, there exists an n 0 such that
Q 0 = I is the identity operator. Therefore for each n ≥ n 0 there exists a ν-bounded transition operator
and
We have
A direct calculation yields
Substituting into (3.16), we obtain
and consequently
Combining this with (3.6) and (3.12)-(3.14), we obtain
The proof of statement (i) is finished.
(ii) Using L defined in (2.1) and (3.7), we obtain
where s 0 is an arbitrary state. Now (ii) follows from (i).
A version of Lemma 3.4 corresponding with a bounded function ν was established by Stettner [42] . When ν is bounded, an elementary proof of Lemma 3.4 (stated as an extension of Ueno's lemma [46] ) is possible [32] .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Choose some > 0. According to Lemma 3.4 there exists some δ such that for all u ∈ U ,
Let u * ∈ U be a Nash equilibrium for the game G δ in the class U of multipolicies (its existence follows from Lemma 3.3). It then follows from (3.17) that u * is anequilibrium (in the class U ) for the original game. The fact that u * is an -equilibrium in the class Γ of all multipolicies follows from Theorem 3 and Remark 1 in [34] (or [18, 14] in the Borel state space framework).
The discounted stochastic game.
In this section, we drop conditions C3 and C4. However, in the unbounded cost case, we make the following assumption.
C7: There exists α ∈ [β, 1) such that
βQ(ν|s, x) ≤ αν(s)
for each s ∈ S and x ∈ X. Using C7, we can easily prove that, for any s ∈ S, any multipolicy γ ∈ Γ, and any number of stages k, we have
where L is the constant defined in C1. This gives us the following lemma. 
for each s ∈ S and any stationary multipolicy u ∈ U.
Fix player i and set
where s ∈ S and u ∈ U. Clearly, K n (s, u) is the nth stage cost for player i under stationary multipolicy u when the game starts at an initial state s ∈ S.
Lemma 4.2. Assume C1 and C7. Then, for each s ∈ S and u ∈ U, we have
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. For n = 1 the inequality follows immediately from (3.7). We now give the induction step. Note that
Using (4.1), our induction hypothesis, and the obvious inequality
which holds for every s ∈ S and u ∈ U , we obtain 
for each s ∈ S and u ∈ U . The game G δ is characterized by the cost functions c i δ , transition probability Q δ , and the function ν δ . Note that if δ is sufficiently small, then the game G δ satisfies condition C1 with L replaced by 2L. From our approximation scheme (the new definition of the space V) and Remark 2.1, it follows also that C2 is satisfied in our game G δ . Since |ν(s) − ν δ (s)| < δ for all s ∈ S, we have (by (4.1))
where α 0 = α + αδ + 2δ and s ∈ S, x ∈ X. Note that β < α 0 , and if δ is sufficiently small, then α 0 < 1, and thus G δ satisfies condition C7 with α replaced by α 0 . Let δ 0 be a positive number such that for every δ < δ 0 the game G δ satisfies conditions of type C1, C2, and C7. In particular, we have β < α 0 < 1. 
where s ∈ Y n , t ∈ S, and x ∈ X. This transformation ensures that the new costsc i are bounded and that
is a transition subprobability such that q(Y n |s, x) is continuous in x for each n and s ∈ S. Moreover, it implies thatD
is the expected discounted cost for player i under any u ∈ U in the transformed (bounded) game. Similarly, as in section 3 we can recognize the game G δ as a game with countably many states. By [11] , such a game has a stationary Nash equilibrium. In other words, our bounded game has an equilibrium u in the class U 0 of all piecewise constant multipolicies. It now follows from Lemma 5.2 in the appendix that u is an equilibrium for the bounded game in the class U . By (4.2), we infer that u is also an equilibrium (in the class U of all stationary multipolicies) for the game G δ .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix ε > 0. By Lemma 4.3, there exists δ < δ 0 such that
for each s ∈ S and u ∈ U . It follows from Lemma 4.4 that the game G δ has an equilibrium u in the class U. Clearly, u is an ε-equilibrium in the class U for the original game. The fact that u is also an ε-equilibrium in Γ follows from Theorem 2 and Remark 1 in [34] (or [14] in the case of Borel state space games).
Appendix.
In this section we restrict our attention to the approximating games and state some auxiliary results on sufficiency of piecewise constant policies in the sense that they can be used to dominate any other policy. Related statements are proven in [1] for countable state space models. Their extension to the present situation would require new notation and some additional measure theoretic work.
Therefore, in this section we restrict ourselves to stationary policies, and in such a case we can use different methods which are based on some standard arguments from the dynamic programming literature [14] .
Let G δ be an approximating game corresponding to a partition of the state space. Recall that U i 0 denotes the set of all piecewise constant stationary policies for player i.
Consider the Markov decision process (MDP) with the state space S, the action space X i , the cost function c, and the transition probability q. The average cost case. We assume that δ is sufficiently small so that the MDP satisfies conditions C1-C4 (restricted to the one-player case). Let J n (s, f ) (J(f )) denote the expected n-stage (expected average) cost (in the MDP) under stationary policy f. For the details, see [14] and [25] . Our approximating game (and thus the MDP) satisfies continuity conditions C1-C2. Because the cost function c and the transition probability correspond to a partition of the state space (and, in addition, the other players use stationary piecewise constant multipolicy u −i ), this implies that one can find some f 0 ∈ U For a detailed discussion of the fact that C3 implies that q n (h|s, f 0 )/n → 0 as n → ∞, consult [14] or [34] .
The discounted cost case. We now assume that the stochastic game satisfies C1, C2, and C7. If δ is sufficiently small, then both G δ and the aforementioned MDP satisfy C1, C2, and C7, but with different constants (see section 4). Let f ∈ U i . By  D n (s, f ) (D(s, f ) ) we denote the expected n-stage discounted (total discounted) cost in the MDP under policy f . The fact that β n q n (d|s, f 0 ) → 0 as n → ∞ follows easily from C7.
